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1.  Introduction 
Many authors who subscribe to some version of  generative syntax account for the two 
readings of such sentences as (la) and (lb) in terms of LF-ambiguity. There is assumed 
to be covert quantifier raising (QR), which results in  two distinct possibilities  for the 
indefinite  quantificational  expressions involved to take scope over each other  (2a, b) 
(see e.g. Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 2000 [1990]: ch. 3, 9, Fanselow & Felix  1993 
[1987]: 192f., Haegeman & Gu6ron 1999: 541, Heim & Kratzer 1998: ch. 7, 8, Kamp & 
Reyle 1993: 279f., 288f.):' 
(1)  a.  Some publisher offended every linguist 
b.  Everyone saw someone 
(2)  a.  vx  33y  [K  (x,  y)l 
b.  3y vx  [K  (x,  y)l 
In this paper, an alternative account is proposed which dispenses with the idea that there 
are different  scope relations  involved in  the readings  of such sentences as in  (1) and, 
consequently, with  QR  as  the  syntactic  operation  to  be  assumed  for  generating  the 
respective LFs. I argue that it is rather focus structure in connection with type semantic 
issues pertaining to the indefinite quantificational expressions involved which result in 
the  different  readings  associated  with  such  sentences  as  in  (1).  The  approach  is 
motivated by an observation which leads to the conclusion that (la) is ambiguous while 
(Ib) is vague.3 This observation is based on an application of Lakoff's (1970) classic so- 
I am grateful to N. Asher, D. Buring, J. Jacobs, T. Kiss, B. Partee, G. Rauh, T. Tappe, C. Umbach for 
comments, discussion,  hints,  advice and questions, and  for food  for thought  in  general  to  all  the 
presenters  of papers at the DGfS-Workshop  on  "Information  structure and the referential  status of 
indefinite expressions" (Leipzig 28 Feb - 3 Mar, 2001), where I presented a version of this paper. 
The paper is submitted to a special issue of "Theoretical  Linguistics",  edited by Klaus von Heusinger 
and Kerstin Schwabe 
See also May 1990 [1977], where the QR account of (supposed) LF-ambiguities of the kind illustrated 
by (1) was introduced and studied in detail for the first time in generative grammar. 
Authors  differ with  respect  to  logical  notations  when  representing  different scope relations.  The 
notation  I use  in  (2) is  adopted  from Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet  (2000 [19901).  Haegeman  & 
Gukron  (1999: 541),  for  instance,  use  the  more  explicit  notation  below  in  representing  the  two 
readings of (2b) (similarly Kamp & Reyle 1993: 279f., 288f.). 
a.  Ax(x=H)+Ey(y=H)&(Sxyj 
b.  Ey(y=H)&Ax(x=H)+(Sxy)  '  That is, neither both are ambiguous, as the above mentioned authors seem to assumc, nor both vague, 
as argued by  Kempson & Cormack (1981). 
ZAS Papers in Linguistics 23, 2001, 23-38 test,  which  I  briefly  recapitulate  and  whose  applicability  in  the  relevant  cases  is 
discussed in the next section. 
2.  Ambiguity vs. vagueness: A problem for the standard account of 
'quantifier scope relations' 
Consider  first how Keenan  (1978:  172) explains  the  difference between  vague  and 
ambiguous sentences. 
There  are many  easily-agreed-upon  instances  of  ambiguous  sentences, such  as  the 
flying planes can be dangerous ones. There are equally many clear cases of  vagueness. 
Thus the Inan  on the table is hurt is vague, not ambiguous, according as the man  is 
Albanian or not. Note  of  course that  the  situations  in  which the  man  is,  or is  not, 
Albanian are quite distinct. But we feel that neither of  these situations is talked about 
in the original sentence. 
We shall propose then the following sufficient condition for a sentence to be judged 
vague, rather than ambiguous, in certain respects: A sentence S is vague according as it 
describes distinct situations a and b if, on a natural occasion of  its use, the speaker of 
the sentence does not  have to know (or believe he knows, a distinction  we will  not 
continue to make) whether in fact a orb  is the case. Thus we may naturally assert that 
the man on the table is hurt without having to know whether the man  is Albanian or 
not, so the sentence is correctly judged to be vague in this respect. 
On the other hand, in a normal assertion of the chickens are ready to eat the speaker 
is expected to know whether the chickens are ready to be eaten or rather are ready to 
dine. So this sentence does not satisfy our criterion of  vagueness, and is more plausibly 
judged  ambiguous.  [...I  All  we  are  saying  then  is  that  if  a  speaker  can  remain 
indifferent  between  alternatives a and b and still meaningfully assert  some sentence 
then the sentence is vague not ambiguous according as a or b obtains. 
Thus, a speaker may make a true utterance by saying The man on the table is hurt in a 
number of possible worlds comprising the set of worlds in which the man on the table is 
Albanian and the set of worlds in which he is not Albanian. And a speaker may make a 
true utterance in saying The chickens are ready to eat in a number of possible worlds 
comprising the set of worlds in which the chickens are ready to be eaten and the set of 
worlds  in which  the chickens are ready to dine. In  deciding  whether  the respective 
utterance is vague or ambiguous we probe into our -  linguistic knowledge informed - 
intuition  as  to  whether  the  speaker  ought  to  or need  not  be  able  to  remove  the 
indeterminacy concerning these different sets of possible worlds in which the utterance 
is true. 
Lakoff's  (1970) so-test  is  designed so as to sharpen our judgement  of whether a 
speaker can remain  indifferent  (as Keenan  says) with  respect to differences between 
states of  affairs which  in  isolation can all  be referred  to truthfully  by  using  a  given 
sentence-string.4  Lakoff  considers  clearly  ambiguous  sentences  such  as  (3a)  in 
comparison to clearly vague sentences such as (3b). 
(3)  a.  Selma likes visiting relatives 
b.  Harry kicked Sam 
4  "A sentence  is  an  output  of  grammar,  a triple  complex  of syntactic, semantic  and  phonological 
information. A sentence-string is  an  uninterpreted surface sentential sequence." (Kempson & Cormack 
1981: 302,n. I.) Focus structure and the referential status of indefinite quantificational expressions 
The ambiguity of (3a) is obvious. (3b) is vague in  that Harry could have kicked Sam 
with his left or his right foot, for example. Lakoff observes that adding and so does/did 
X to (3a, b), as in (4a, b), results in a significant difference as to possible readings. 
(4)  a.  Selma likes visiting relatives and so does Sam 
b.  Harry kicked Sam and so did Pete 
(4b) can be used to refer truthfully to the state of  affairs where Harry kicked Sam with 
his left foot and Pete kicked Sam with his right foot. In contrast, (4a) cannot be used to 
refer truthfully to a state of affairs where Selma likes going to visit relatives and Sam 
hates going to visit relatives but likes relatives who are visiting. That is, it is possible to 
associate one of the vaguely different alternatives of  interpretation with the first clause 
of (4b) and the other with the conjoined so-clause, but it is not possible to associate one 
of  the ambiguously different alternatives of interpretation with  the first clause of  (4a) 
and the other with the conjoined so-clause. These are linguistic effects resulting from 
our knowledge of the lexical-syntactic structure of the sentences involved and the way 
they are semantically computed (which 1  assume is compositional). 
This observation can  be  applied as a test  for distinguishing  ambiguous and vague 
sentences  also  in  cases  where,  supposedly, different  quantifier  scope  relations  are 
involved. (Well-known objections to the applicability of  the test  in  the relevant cases 
will be discussed shortly.) Consider a model in  which there are three Roman and three 
Greek letters and three numbers. (5a) appropriately and truthfully describes the situation 
depicted by (5b). 
(5)  a.  Every Roman letter is mapped to some number, and so is every Greek 
letter 
b.  a  1 
b+  2 
a\  ' 
P  2 
c  ------t  3  Y/  3 
Thus, the clause Every Roman letter is mapped to some number, which  is parallel  to 
(Ib) in  the  relevant  respects,  turns  out  to  be  vague  rather  than  ambiguous.5 Vague 
readings are not to be distinguished by different LF-representations. Thus we have lost a 
motivation  for assuming that  sentences  like (Ib) are  ambiguous between  two  truth- 
conditionally  distinct  interpretations  due  to  reversed  quantifier  scope  relations 
represented along the lines of the logical  formulae in  (2). Consequently, we have also 
lost  a motivation  for postulating  QR, for it  is  the function  of  QR to attain different 
quantifier scope relations. In  contrast to (Sa), however, (6a) cannot be used to refer to 
(6b). So there seems to be genuine ambiguity  involved in  sentences  such as (la), to 
which Some Roman letter is mapped to every number is parallel in the crucial respects. 
(6)  a.  Some Roman  letter is mapped to every number, and so is some Greek 
letter 
b.  a1 
P-2 
c  Y+3 
'  In  a note, Hornstein (1995: 237f.. n. 12) comes to the same conclusion with  respect to the example 
Every nzarl kisseda worizan. In contrast to the approach taken in the present paper, Hornstein, although 
he aims at doing away with QR  as well, still assumes that there are quantifier scope relations at issue 
in such sentences as in (I). It has been argued that the so-test cannot be applied in cases where one of the different 
readings entails the other, i.e. where the different readings stand in the relation of what 
Zwicky & Sadock (1975) call "privative opposition".6 This is because "the existence of 
the more general understanding  [i.e. the entailed one] guarantees that  we will  get all 
possible  understandings" with  the result  that  "we will  always conclude that  we  are 
dealing with a lack of  specification [i.e. 'vagueness']".  (Ib.: 23.) Although true, this is 
no argument against  what  has been  said above about  ambiguity  and  vagueness with 
respect to sentences like (la), (lb), Every Roman letter is mapped to some number and 
Some Roman letter is mapped to every number. For the claim that one reading of such 
sentences entails the other follows on the assumption that these readings correspond to 
the predicate calculus formulae of  (2), for which  it holds indeed that the 3V-formula 
logically entails the V3-formula. However, it is my claim that the differences in reading 
between  the respective sentences do not correspond to these formulae. Hence, there is 
no reason to assume a priori that in the semantics which is appropriate there holds an 
entailment relation between the respective readings as well. Moreover, if  there was an 
entailment relation  between  the readings  of the respective  sentences, then  we would 
expect  to  get vagueness  as the result  of the  application of  the so-test not  only  with 
sentences like (lb), i.e. those which exhibit the every-some order, but  also with those 
like (la), i.e. those which exhibit the some-every order. The fact that this is not the case, 
as shown by (6), proves that the so-test is indeed applicable in the cases in question. 
I would like to present one more argument for the claim that sentences like (la) are 
ambiguous while those like (lb) are vague. Imagine a situation in which various people 
tell you  truthfully what is going on between a group of three girls, Mary Miller, Mary 
Hunt, and Mary Spencer, and a group of three boys, Peter Smith, Peter Jones, Peter Hill. 
A first communicator tells you  that Peter Smith kissed Mary, another that Peter Jones 
kissed Mary, and a third that Peter Hill kissed Mary, without your having any idea about 
which Mary each communicator has in  mind. Your utterance of  (7) is appropriate and 
true with respect to the given domain of discourse, and nobody has the communicative 
right to expect from you that you are able to precisify what you mean by some girl (i.e. 
either 'some specific/singular girl' or 'some girl or other but not some specific/singular 
girl').7 
(7)  Every boy kissed some girl 
You cannot be said to equivocate in uttering (7), and you  are fully justified  in refusing 
to  precisify  along the  lines just  mentioned,  for otherwise you  would  run  the  risk  of 
saying  something  false.'  You  are  as  justified  in  uttering  (7)  as  the  speaker  from 
Keenan's  passage above is justified  in  uttering  The man on the table is hurt without 
knowing whether the man is Albanian or not. 
Compare this  situation with  one in which a communicator tells you  truthfully that 
Peter kissed Mary Miller, another that Peter kissed Mary Hunt, a third that Peter kissed 
Mary Spencer, without your having any idea about which Peter each communicator has 
in mind. Suppose now you uttered (8) with respect to the given domain of discourse. 
(8)  Some boy kissed every girl 
6  See also Kempson & Cormack 1981, for instance. Actually, this argument extends to the whole family 
of tests for ambiguity to which the so-test belongs (called "identity tests" by Zwicky B Sadock). 
7  On the notion of precisification and its relation to the vaguenesslambiguity distinction see Pinkal 1995 
119851, 1991. 
a  Cf.  Pinkalms  (1995  119851:  100) criterion  that  "[plure  vagueness  is  present  when  an  indefinite 
expression does not allow natural precisifications." Focus structure and the referential status of indefinite qunntificational expressions 
Of  course, this utterance is also a true one. However, now I am justified  in reproaching 
you with equivocation, i.e. with not being able to precisify what you mean by some boy 
although  a felicitous  utterance  of  (8) presupposes  that  you  should be.9 You  are  in  a 
communicatively  infelicitous  position  parallel  to  that  of  a  person  who  utters  The 
chickens are ready to eat without knowing whether the chickens are ready to be eaten or 
whether the chickens are ready to dine (although to a much more subtle degree). In this 
case,  you  have  no  communicative  right  to  remain  indifferent  as  to  the  piece  of 
knowledge whether  some specificlsingular  boy  or  some boy  or  other  but  not  some 
specific/singular boy kissed every girl. This difference between  (7) and (8) supports the 
claim that the former is vague while the latter is ambiguous. 
These intuitions might be felt to be delicate and subtle. Yet they  are supported by 
much more robust intuitions about the 'behavior'  of (7) and (8) under negation. 
(9)  a.  It is not true that every boy kissed some girl 
b.  It is not true that some boy kissed every girl 
With respect to the first state of affairs, (9a) is clearly false irrespective of whether there 
was  one specific  Mary  or  some Mary  or  other  who  was  kissed  by  every  Peter.  In 
contrast, we do not know which truth value to assign to (9b) with respect to the second 
state of affairs. In (9a), we are confronted with the negation of one sentence which (i.e. 
the negation)  is false. In  (9b), we are confronted  with  the negation  of  an  ambiguous 
sentence-string which corresponds to one sentence which is false (some Peter or other 
kissed  every  Mary)  and  to  a  second  sentence  about  which  we  do not  have  enough 
information to say if  it is false or true (some specific Peter kissed every ~ar~).'' 
If  we continue to  think in  terms of quantifier scope relations  about the ambiguity 
involved  here,  then  the  problem  is  how  to  generate  different  scope  relations  for 
sentences like (la) and block them for sentences like (lb). This may be done along the 
lines suggested by Hornstein (1995, 1999; see also fn. 5). As an alternative, I propose an 
account  in  terms of  focus structure in  connection  with  type  semantic considerations 
which is not based on scope relations. 
3.  Focus structure and its syntactic representation 
Let us assume that every representation of a root clause has either the general structure 
in (10a) or the one in (lob). 
with one of the three representations in (1  1) as possible realisations:" 
9  Cf.  Pinkal  (1995  [1985]:  81):  "Expressions  that  are  ambiguous  in  the  narrow  sense  require 
precisification." 
10  I implicitly relegate the issue of vagueness and ambiguity to the lexical characteristics of some in this 
argumentation,  which recalls that of Fodor 81  Sag (1982). Indeed, as will  become clear below,  my 
account of the ambiguity of sentences like (8) in terms of focus structure is closely linked to one in 
terms of the lexical  ambiguity of some. The point  of my  approach is that this lexical  ambiguity is 
exploited differently in sentences like (8) as compared to those like (7). 
I  I  In my presentation of the paper at DGfS 2001, I assumed that in thetic sentences there is a FocP as 
well  and that the whole IP moves to spec-Foc. For syntactic reasons which are of no interest in the 
present contcxt, I have abandoned this assumption. Nothing of significance for the semantic questions 
addressed here follows from this modification. (1 1)  predicate focus 
categorical 
FocP 
A 
Foc' 
A 
Foc  IP 
argument focus 
identificational 
FocP 
Foc  ~p 
/  [+foch,]* 
I  [+fochh] 
sentence focus 
thetic 
The concepts of predicate focus, argument focus and sentence focus structures are taken 
from Lambrecht (1994). In his theory, focus structure is defined in relation to a specific 
kind of presupposition, the so-called relevance presupposition, of which there are three 
types, each being associated with one of the three focus structure types. 
The relevance presupposition  associated  with  predicate focus structure determines 
the relevance of  the respective utterance as providing relevant predicative  information 
about  a  discourse  entity  under  discussion,  that  is,  about  a  topic.  (12)  provides  a 
discourse fragment which illustrates a predicate focus utterance in A's  reply, with my 
car or the pronoun  it being the topic expression. (Small capitalisation here and in the 
examples below signifies a nuclear pitch accent on the respective word; a falling pitch 
accent would be appropriate.) 
(12)  predicate focus structure 
Q:  What happened to your car? 
A:  My car/It broke DOWN.  (from Lambrecht 1994: 223) 
A sentence with predicate focus structure corresponds to a categorical sentence from the 
well-known thetic/categorical distinction (see e.g. Sasse 1987, Drubig 1992, Lambrecht 
1994: pass.). 
The relevance presupposition  associated with  argument focus structure determines 
the  relevance  of  the respective  utterance  as  providing  the  missing  information  in  a 
relevant,  variable  containing, that  is,  open  proposition.  (13) provides  an  illustrating 
discourse fragment. X broke down is the relevant open proposition, and the phrase my 
car in A's reply, which is both an information-structural argument"  and identificational 
focus expression, provides an identificational constant for the variable x.'" 
" It should be noted that the "word 'argument' in 'argument focus' is used here as a cover term for any 
non-predicating expression in a proposition, i.e. it includes terms expressing place, time, and manner. 
It  is  neutral  with  respect  to  the  issue  of  the  valence  of predicates  ('subcategorization')  and  the 
argument-adjunct distinction." (Lambrecht 1994: 224.) 
13  For E.  Kiss  (1998).  who distinguishes  informational  from identificational foci, the  latter  must  be 
exhaustive. This is not necessarily  the case for Lambrecht (1994:  122f.). I follow Lambrecht without 
further discussion. Focus structure and the referential status of indefinite quantificational expressions 
(1  3)  argument focus structure 
Q:  I heard your motorcycle broke down? 
A:  My CAR broke down.  (from Lambrecht 1994: 223) 
A sentence with  argument focus structure is also called identificational by  Lambrecht 
(1994). 
The relevance presupposition associated with sentence focus structure is zero. This 
does of course not mean that the utterance is irrelevant nor that it is not associated with 
any presuppositions.  It means that there is neither  a topic nor an  open proposition  in 
relation to which the respective utterance is relevant. An illustration is given in (14). 
(14)  sentence focus structure 
Q:  What happened? 
A:  My CAR broke down.  (from Lambrecht 1994: 223) 
I conceive of a relevance presupposition  as an  assumption held by the speaker which 
belongs to the context of  an utterance and which, just  like any other  resupposition, is 
74  essential for an assertive utterance to be or not to be truth-evaluable.  Associating an 
inappropriate  type  of  relevance  presupposition  with  such  an  utterance  results  in  its 
failure to be truth-evaluable. 
I  will  use  the  categorical/identificational/thetic terminology  in  the  following, 
replacing Lambrecht's (1994) predicate focus structure with categorical focus structure, 
argument  focus  structure  with  identificational  focus  structure,  and  sentence  focus 
structure  with  thetic  focus  structure.  On  the  one  hand,  this  is  because  the 
theticlcategorical terminology and distinction is older and more widely known. On the 
other hand, I have made the experience that especially the terms 'predicate focus' and 
'argument  focus'  tend  to  produce  confusion.  However,  I  adhere  to  Lambrecht's 
threefold distinction of focus structure types both with respect to his characterization of 
them in terms of different kinds of relevance presupposition and with respect to the idea 
that these three types -  categorical, identificational, thetic -  are the possible structural 
realization in an information-structural dimension called focus structure.15 
I  am  assuming that  focus structure  is  incorporated in  syntax  such that  every  root 
clause, and thus its derivation, manifests one of  the three focus structure types. Root 
clauses (or sentences) in the traditional sense, which are focus structurally unspecified, 
have no theoretical status, that is, they do not exist in the theory proposed here. 
The essential  characteristic  of  the derivation of  focus-structured  root clauses - or, 
simply,  root  clauses - is  the  absence  or  presence  of  topic  and  focus  features  and 
consequently the absence or presence of phrase movement to the specifier position of a 
head Foc of  a functional projection FocP (spec-Foc). In categorical and identificational 
sentences, there is movement to spec-Foc. The phrase which moves to spec-Foc carries 
a head  feature  [?fo~~h]  which  is  checked  against the corresponding specifier feature 
[+foch,] in the Foc-head such that both of them are erased (erasure being symbolized by 
the star (*) in the tree structures of  (1 1)). The head feature [+fochh] of  the Foc-head is 
not erased. It is interpretable, that is, it has a semantic function and thus contributes to 
I4  On  the role of  presuppositions  and  context  in  general  with  respect  to  truth  evaluability,  see e.g. 
Chierchia  & McConnell-Ginet  2000  [1990]:  ch.  6; as  to  the  conception  of  'context'  as  a  set of 
assumptions, see Sperber & Wilson 1995 [1986]. 
IS  The other information-structural dimension has to do with the speaker's assumptions about the degrees 
of  identifiability and activeness ('givenlnew') of  discourse entities in  the hearer's mind  and the way 
these assumptions are lexical-syntactically reflected in sentences. the interpretation of the clause.16 If  [-focl-features  are involved, we are confronted with 
categorical  focus  structure,  and  the  phrase  which  moves  to  spec-Foc  is  a  topic 
expression. If  [+foe]-features are involved, we are confronted with identificational focus 
structure,  and  the  phrase  which  moves  to  spec-Foc  is  an  identificational  focus 
expression. In  a  thetic  sentence  there  are no  [kfocl-features, no  FocP  and  thus  no 
movement to spec-Foc. 
For the limited purposes  in this  paper, I restrict  myself  to considerations of  cases 
where  nominal expressions move to spec-Foc. I call these nominal expressions 'DP', 
making no distinction between quantified and non-quantified nominal expression. 
4.  The semantic function of the [kfocl-features 
In truth-functional semantics inspired by Montague (see Thomason (ed.)  1974, see also 
Heim  & Kratzer  1998), transitive  verbs  like  offend  and  see  as  in  (15)  =  (1)  are 
commonly said to be of semantic type <e,<e,t>>. 
(15)  a.  Some publisher offended every linguist 
b.  Everyone saw someone 
If we take a flexible type in situ approach for the complement and the subject DPs with 
which such verbs combine semantically, we see that in principle these may be of three 
types: 
(16)  a.  e  as object and subject 
b.  <<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>>  as object 
c.  <<e,t>,t>  as subject 
The types given in (16b, c) correspond to the generalized quantifier interpretation of a 
subject or object DP, that is, an interpretation as a set of  sets. While DPs like everyone 
or every publisher  arguably have only the generalized quantifier interpretation,''  there 
are other  DPs, including proper  names,  which  are principally  interpretable  either as 
individuals, i.e. type e expressions, or as generalized quantifiers.'8 
Referential expressions can be identified with type e expressions.  It  is well  known 
that indefinite quantificational DPs like someone or some publisher as in (15) above can 
be either referential or non-referential. That is, such DPs are principally type ambiguous 
between the three types mentioned in (16). This holds also for other kinds of  indefinite 
quantificational  DPs, such  as  a  man  or  one man, but  rarely,  if  ever,  for DPs like 
everyone or every publisher (see fn. 17). Let us simplify matters and assume that for the 
16  As to the checking  mechanism  see e.g. Radford  1997: ch. 5, towards which  my  sketch of  [kfocl- 
feature checking is  roughly  oriented. Technically different and for syntax  at large probably  more 
appropriate accounts are available and still others imaginable. There should be no problem for anyone 
of them to accommodate movement of a phrase to the specifier position  of some functional phrase 
with different semantic processing of that phrase depending on differences in the features responsible 
for the movement. 
" According to Partee (1987: 132), there are no e-type readings only for such DPs as are "most clearly 
'quantificational': no man, no men, at most one man,  few  men, not every man, must nzen [but see also 
Partee's  note 21 on nzost-DPs].  Every man could get an e-type reading [...I  in case there is only one 
man; but linguistically it never seems to act as a singular 'referential' term". 
IR  As to the interpretation of proper names as generalized quantifiers, see e.g.  Chierchia & McConnell- 
Ginet 2000 [19901: 512f. Focus structure and the referential status of indefinite quantificational expressions 
latter  the  referential  type  e  is  principally  ruled  out.  These,  then,  are  lexical  facts, 
ultimately determined by the lexical entries for the items some(one), every(one). 
Let us assume that the [rfocl-features in the Foc-head determine the semantic types 
of the phrases in spec-Foc in the following way: 
(17)  a.  [-fochh]  selects type e for a DP in  spec-Foc. 
b.  [+fochh]  selects type <<e,t>,t> for a DP in spec-Foc 
That DPs in spec-Foc of  a [-focl-head  are of  type e is supported by authors who claim 
that topic expressions are referential.19 
If we apply the type selection mechanism in (17) to the examples in (15). we see that 
(15a) is threefold ambiguous, as shown in (18). 
(1  8)  a.  categorical: 
[F~~P  [Some publisher],  Foc~_~,,~  [p  t offended [every 
Jinguistl..e,,e,t,,,,e,t,,ll 
b.  identificational: 
[F~~P  [Some publisher],,,,,,,,  Foc~,~,,~  [IP  t offended [every 
linguist]...  ,<e,t,,,<c,t,~ll 
c.  thetic: 
LIP  [Some publisher], -  ..e,t,,t,  offended [every linguistl~~,,,,,,,,,<eet>>l 
The subject some publisher  may be in spec-Foc  of  a  [focl-head (categorical), or in 
spec-Foc of a [+foe]-head (identificational); or there are no [kfocl-features and no FocP 
at all, and the type selection mechanism  of  (17) does not  apply  (thetic). In  all  three 
cases, the  object  every  linguist  is of  type  <<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>>,  as  type  e  is  ruled  out 
lexically. As regards the subject some publisher, it is of type e in the categorical case, of 
type <<e,t>,t>  in  the identificational case, and  in the thetic case, it  is indeterminate 
between  types  e  and  <<e,t>,t>,  since  its  type  has  not  been  selected.  (I  represent 
indeterminateness or vagueness  between  types  and interpretations  by  the  tilde.)  The 
interpretations of (l8a-c) in h-notation are given in (l9a-c). 
l9  ~eee.$.  Strawson 1971 [1964]: 97, Reinhart  1981: 65ff., Prince 1981: 25lff., 1984: 217f., Sasse 1987: 
555, E.  Kiss  1995: 7, Erteschik-Shir  1997: pass.  As  pointed  out  by  J.  Jacobs  (in  DGfS  2001 
conference discussion),  this raises the problem  that an  every-DP  cannot be topic expression. How, 
then, can cases like the following be explained, where everybody in A's utterance seems to be a topic 
expression? 
a.  Q: Where did everybody go? 
A: Everybody went home. 
The only reason why we may think that everybody in (aA) is a topic expression is that it appears in the 
context  question,  i.e.  its  denotation  is  given  or  'active'  in  Lamhrecht's  (1994)  sense.  However, 
givenness/activeness of an expression's denotationlreferent is no sufficient condition for its being a 
topic  expression  (see  e.g.  ib.:  pass.).  I  would  argue  that  (aA)  is  a  thetic  sentence  and  that, 
consequently,  everybody  is  neither  topic  nor  identificational  focus expression.  Note  that  a  more 
natural  utterance  than  (aA)  in  the  context  of  (aQ)  is  (hi)  below,  which  is  derived  from  the 
identificational focus  structure  (hii) by  a  discourse  or  processing  effort minimization  rule  which 
deletes everything but the identificational focus expression (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1995 [1986]: 21 I). 
b.  i.  Home. 
ii.  HOME,  they went. 
The slight unnaturalness of (aA)  is due to the  fact  that a  wh-question  suggests an  identificational 
sentence as answer, not a thetic one. But only a small amount of pragmatic inferencing is needed  to 
achieve the required contextual effect (in the sense of Sperber & Wilson  1995 [1986]) by  uttering a 
thetic sentence instead of an identificational one in cases like this. (19)  a.  [[(18a)] = [hx : x E  D,  .  x offended every linguist] (some publisher) 
b.  [[(18b)J = [hx : x E D,,,,,  . some publisher x] (offended every linguist) 
c.  U(l8c)l= I(18a)ll -  U(18b)l 
In contrast to (15a), (15b) appears to be only twofold ambiguous, since the selection of 
type e for everyone in  spec-Foc by a [-focl-head  and thus categorical focus structure is 
ruled  out.  As  shown  in  (20),  (15b)  may  have  either  thetic  focus  structure,  or 
identificational focus structure with everyone in  spec-Fo~[+~,,,~,  where the semantic type 
of  the subject everyone is <<e,t>,t> and the object someone is indeterminate between 
types e and <<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>>. 
(20)  a.  identificational focus structure: 
[FO~P   every on el<<,,^>,^> Foc[+foc~  [IP  t saw [someonel, - ..,,,e,t,,,,e,~,ll 
b.  thetic focus structure: 
[IP [Ever~onel<<~,~,,t>  saw [someonel, - ..e,.e,t,>,,e,t>,l 
Actually,  (20a)  and  (20b) turn  out  to  have  identical,  if  vague,  interpretations.  The 
vagueness is due to the type indeterminacy of someone, which produces vagueness in 
the reading of  the VP saw  someone (see (21a)) and consequently in  that of  the whole 
clause (see (2  1 b)). 
(21)  a.  [[saw someone] = 
[hx : x E  D,  . saw x] (someone) -  [hx : x E  D.e,.e,r,,  . x someone] (saw) 
b.  [[(20a)J = [[(20b)] = [hx : x E D,,,,  .  everyone x] (saw someone) 
The LF-difference between  (20a) and (20'0) is semantically conflated to  (21b), which 
itself is vague in the way indicated. 
5.  Taking stock: Focus structure instead of quantifier scope 
It is my claim that what has traditionally been analysed as an ambiguity in terms of the 
scopal relations between existential and universal quantifiers in sentences such as in (1) 
= (15) is more appropriately captured by the focus structure differences just discussed. 
(15)  a.  Some publisher offended every linguist 
b.  Everyone saw someone 
The truth-conditionally  different  interpretations of  a sentence like (15a), which many 
authors have analyzed  in  terms  of  3V vs.  V3  quantifier  scope relations,  reflect  the 
ambiguity between the categorical reading on the one hand and the identificational and 
thetic readings on the other hand. The intuition that there is a reading of (15a) in which 
the speaker has some specific publisher in mind of whom he predicates that he offended 
every linguist, without actually specifying the identity of this publisher (see Kamp & 
Reyle  1993:  289f.),  is  represented  as the  categorical  reading,  where  a  [-focl-head 
selects the referential type e denotation for the indefinite quantificational DP in  spec- 
Foc. In contrast to (15a), (15b) does not have a categorical reading. This corresponds to 
the fact that (l5b) is ultimately not ambiguous at all, as we have seen. I would maintain 
that what linguists have in mind who consider sentences like (15b) to be ambiguous in 
terms  of  quantifier  scope  relations  is  rather  the  vagueness  resulting  from  the  type 
indeterminateness of the indefinite quantificational DP in object position. Focus structure and the referential status of indefinite quantificational expressions 
6.  On  the  structural  ambiguity  contributed  by  thetic  focus 
structure 
Often  it  is possible to  find states of  affairs with  respect to  which  one reading  of  an 
ambiguous sentence is true and the other false. Thus, with respect to the state of affairs 
depicted in  (22a), the categorical clause (22b) is false while the identificational clause 
(22c) is true . 
b.  [~~~p  [Some letter], FOC[-~,,~  [~p  t is mapped to [every 
numberl<<e,<e,t>>,<eet>>ll 
C.  [FO~P  [Some letterl<,e,~,t,  Foc[+focl  LIP  t is mapped to [every 
numberl..e,<e,i,,,,e,i~,ll 
Indeed, this  relation  between  states of  affairs and linguistic  expressions leads to  the 
detection  of  structural  ambiguity.  But does  this  mean  that,  conversely, it  should be 
possible  to  find  ambiguity-sensitive  states  of  affairs  for  every  two  structures  that 
represent an ambiguity? I do not  think so. While each truth-conditional  difference in 
expressions using the same lexical material  is reflected as a structural ambiguity in the 
syntax,  there  is,  as  far  as I  can  see,  no  conceptual  requirement  that  each  case  of 
structural ambiguity correspond to a difference in truth conditions. If this is correct, then 
there is no problem for my account when I concede that there is no state of affairs which 
is  ambiguity-sensitive  such  that  reference  to  it  by  a  thetic  sentence  yields  a  truth 
evaluation not shared by any of the other corresponding  sentence^.'^ In other words: If 
some  thetic  sentence  T  has  either  a  corresponding  categorical  or  identificational 
sentence, as in (20), then T shares its truth evaluation with the corresponding categorical 
or  identificational  sentence.  If  some  thetic  sentence  T  has  both  corresponding 
categorical  and identificational sentences, as in (la), then the truth evaluation  of  T is 
identical  to that of at least one of the two others.  In  still other words: Depending on 
whether a thetic sentence T has one (categorical or identificational) or two (categoricd 
and identificational) corresponding sentences, the set of  truth conditions for T is either 
identical to the set of truth conditions for the one corresponding sentence (CT = CC,,),~' 
or is the union of the sets of truth conditions for the two corresponding sentences (CT = 
Cc u c~).~~  Conversely, for categorical  and  identificational  sentences  which  have  a 
corresponding thetic sentence this means that the LF-difference existing between them 
does not correspond to a difference in truth conditions. Although LF-different, a thetic 
sentence does not  differ truth conditionally  from its corresponding categorical  and/or 
identificational sentence(s). 
20  In the present context I mean by 'corresponding sentences' those sentences which are not distinguished 
by  the  usual  orthographical  representation  of  a  sentence-string,  but  which  have  different  focus 
structures.  " With CT the set of truth cond~tions  for a thetic sentence T;  Cc,  the set of truth conditions for either the 
corresponding categorical or identificational sentence.  ''  With  Cc  the  set  of  truth  conditions  for the  categorical  and  C,  the sct  of  truth  conditions  for  the 
identificational sentence corresponding to T. 7.  Implications and speculations 
The main  objective of  the present  paper  was  to  propose  an  account  of  the  different 
readings  of  such  sentences  as  in  (1)  =  (15)  in  terms  of  focus  structure  and  type 
indeterminateness  instead of  the common quantifier scope explanation. However, the 
approach  taken  here  implies that  different  focus  structure  types  for sentence-strings 
have  to  be  assumed  not  only  for those  cases  where  quantificational  expressions in 
clausal subject and object positions are involved, but for all kinds of  sentence^.'^ That 
is, every root clause (apart from those mentioned in  fn. 23) has one of the three focus 
structure types derived by the syntactic mechanism explained in section 3 above and, in 
the categorical  and identificational  cases, is subject to  the type  selection  mechanism 
postulated in  (17) with attendant semantic implications and, possibly, truth conditional 
effects. I believe that this is indeed the case. For example, sentence-strings like those in 
(23) are indeed focus structurally ambiguous in the way indicated. 
(23)  a. 
a'. 
a". 
a"'. 
b. 
b'. 
b". 
b"' 
C. 
c'. 
c". 
John is ill 
categorical: 
identificational: 
thetic: 
Somebody is ill 
categorical: 
identificational: 
thetic: 
Everybody is ill 
identificational: 
thetic: 
[FO~P tEverybod~l,,~,~,,~>  Foc~+r~,~  [IP  is illI,,,t>l 
[IP tEver~bodyl<,~,~,,~,  [is illI<,,1>1 
The point  is  that  we  do not  always  experience truth-conditional  effects  with  these 
ambiguities. We do not experience truth-conditional effects between  (23a') and (23aU), 
for instance.  On the one hand, this is because the distinction between  the individual 
John  and  the  set of  sets to which  John  belongs  is  truth-conditionally  irrelevantz4 - 
although  not  semantic-computationally  irrelevant,  for  the  direction  of  functional 
application  is  different  between  (23a')  and  (23aM)."  On  the  other  hand,  the 
circumstances in which each of them can be appropriately uttered are disjoint. And this 
is because  their relevance  presuppositions  (see above, sect.  3) are different,  namely 
'John  is  a  topic  for  comment  x'  in  the  categorical  case  and  'x  is  ill'  in  the 
identificational case.26 
23  Except  some  kinds  of  thetic  sentences  like  weather  sentences  (It's  raining)  or  expletive  there- 
sentences  (There  was once a king),  where we know from the presence  of  an  expletive  in  initial 
position that they can neither be categorical nor identificational, as expletives can neither be topic nor 
identificational focus expressions. On expletive there-sentences as thetic  sentences see also Drubig 
1992: 167, pass. 
'"his  does not  seem to be the case with  indefinite quantificational expressions like somebod), as in 
(23b), where the categorical reading with e-type (referential) somebody may be argued to differ truth 
conditionally from the identificational reading with <<e,t>,t>-type (quantificational) so~nebody. 
25  In  (23~1,  thcrc are no differences in the semantic type of every6ody nor, consequently, differences in 
the direction of functional application between  the identificational  and the thetic reading. Hence we 
pet semantic conflation of syntactically different structures.  - 
'hole  that this difference has an intonational reflex in that John will carry the nuclear pitch accent in 
the identificational sentence and no nuclear pitch accent in the categorical sentence. Focus structure and the referential status of indefinite quantificational expressions 
But, of course, the relevance presuppositions of  categorical, identificational and thetic 
sentences  are  always  different,  and  thus  the  circumstances  in  which  they  can  be 
appropriately  uttered  are  always disjoint.  Does  it  make (more than  trivial)  sense to 
compare  the  truth  conditions  of  sentences  which  can  never  be  uttered  in  the  same 
circumstances? If the answer is no, as I am inclined to believe, then the general truth- 
conditional  neutrality  of  thetic  focus  structure  with  respect  to  the  corresponding 
categorical  andlor  identificational  sentence  and  the  truth-conditional  neutrality  of 
categorical and identificational sentences in cases like (23a') vs. (23a") may turn out to 
be a meaningless construct we can do away with. The most appropriate way of viewing 
the  relation  between  focus  structured  sentences,  truth  conditions  and  relevance 
presuppositions may then be this: Every (focus structured) sentence has its own set of 
appropriateness  conditions  of  use  restricted  (among  other  things)  by  its  relevance 
presupposition; the set  of  truth conditions  is relativized to  the set of  appropriateness 
conditions. 
8.  Conclusion and outlook 
In this paper I have discussed an alternative approach to the analysis of one simple type 
of sentences involving indefinite quantificational expressions for which  ambiguities in 
terms  of  quantifier  scope variations  have traditionally been  assumed.  Such sentences 
and  their  different  readings  have  been  used  to  motivate  the  syntactic  operation  of 
quantifier raising  at LF  (QR). That  is, QR  has been  invented  in  order to  derive the 
different quantifier  scope relations that we find in  predicate calculus formulae of  the 
3VIV3-type, which supposedly represent the different readings of such sentences. It has 
been  argued that  these logical formulae do not  adequately express the differences in 
interpretation of such examples and that an account in terms of focus structure and type 
semantic considerations is more appropriate. In this analysis of the respective examples 
there is no need for QR. 
The reader will rightly guess that I am dreaming of being able to dispense with both 
the  quantifier  scope  hypothesis  and  the  QR  mechanism  in  all  the  other  relevant 
examples as well. An attempt at the realization of such a dream will require much more 
work,  a project  which  cannot be launched here. However, in  response to a question 
raised by a commentat~r,~'  I would like to address the case of so-called inverse linking 
phenomena in the Appendix. 
Appendix: Some remarks on inverse linking phenomena 
'Inverse  linking'  refers  to  those  examples  where  the  reading  in  which  a  lower 
quantificational  expression  seems  to  take  scope  over  a  higher  quantificational 
expression is the only one possible or at least the strongly preferred one (see e.g. May 
1990  [1977]:  61ff.,  1985:  pass.,  Heim  & Kratzer  1998:  197f., 221ff.,  233ff.).  The 
following are two cases in point. 
a.  categorical:  John is ILL 
h.  identificational:  JOHN is ill 
" In the discussion of my paper at DGfS 2001. (24)  a.  One apple in  every basket  is rotten  (from Heim % Kratzer  1998:  197) 
b.  Somebody from every city despises it (from May 1985: 68) 
The inversely linked readings of  (24a, b)  are the salient, most natural  ones: In  every 
basket there is one apple which is rotten; every city has at least one citizen who despises 
the city of  which  helshe  is a citizen. The point of  these examples is  that  QR  of  the 
embedded  every-DP  seerns  to  account  straightforwardly  both  for  the  type-semantic 
issues involved in the semantic composition of the sentences (see Heim & Kratzer 1998: 
197f. with respect to (24a)) and for the fact that the pronoun it in (24b) can be bound by 
every city (which it has  to  in  the relevant  reading) given standard assumptions  about 
binding in terms of standard c-command (see ib.: 234f.).'*  As to the question of how the 
problem of  binding may be solved in an approach in  which there is no QR at all, see 
Hornstein (1995: 106ff., 118ff.) for various suggestions. I would like to go into some 
more detail  about the type-semantic  issue addressed by Heim & Kratzer  (1998:  197) 
with respect to (24a). 
Heim & Kratzer (1998:  197f.) present an attempt at a flexible type  in  situ analysis 
which fails. The essential passage is the following (ib.): 
'in' has the same type of  meaning as a transitive verb, <e,et>. So 'every'  must have its 
type <et,<<e,et>,et>>  meaning here. Thus we  get: 
[[in every basket] = hx . for every basket y, x is in y 
We proceed to the next node up by Predicate Modification and get: 
[[apple in every basket] = hx . x is an apple and for every basket y, x is  in y 
Of course, combining the denotation of apple with that of  in every basket by Predicate 
Modification  will  result  in  nothing  but  the  non-salient  (perhaps  impossible)  reading 
where  there  is  one single apple which  is  in  every  basket  and  which  is  rotten.  The 
analysis fails since Heim & Kratzer assume a single, rigid type for in here (but see ib.: 
66f. and fn. 33 below) while allowing a flexible type only for every. However, there is 
no reason to assume that there is only one possible semantic type for a preposition like 
in. To assume type  <e,<e,t>> for in and  to  use Predicate  Modification,  as Heim & 
Kratzer do in the above passage, is only justified if  in is a lexical preposition.29 Yet, in 
every basket within the DP one apple in every basket in the salient reading of (24a) does 
not seem to be a lexical PP. If  it were one, then  in  every basket would denote a local 
space, and it would be possible to substitute the locative deictic pro-form  there for it 
under preservation of meaning.30  This is not possible, as the infelicity of (25B) suggests. 
(25)  A:  One apple in every basket was rotten. 
B:  Yes, you're right. #One apple there was rotten. 
Which semantic type does this 'non-lexical'  in have?" 
28  More precisely,  it is QR  in the form of adjunction to IP that allows for straightforward, standard, 
binding of  the pronoun. In view  of  the problem  that  LF-extraction  of ever)'  city  from the subject 
violates a syntactic island condition, May (1985: 68f.) proposes an alternative to his 1977 analysis in 
which the embedded quantified expression does not adjoin by QR to IP but to its own containing DP. 
With  an accordingly  adjusted  definition of  c-command  the configuration necessary  for binding the 
pronoun is achieved. 
29  See Rauh (e.g. 1995, 1996, 1997a. 1997b) on lexical, grammatical and governed prepositions. 
'O  Thanks to G. Rauh for pointing this out to me.  '' I call it 'non-lcxical' for brevity's sake here. In more cautious terms, it is at least not a typical  lexical 
preposition. Nor is  it a grammatical or governed preposition  in Rauh's (1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b) 
sense. Focus structure and the referential status of indefinite quantificational expressions 
The syntactic bracketing of the DP one apple in every basket, reduced to the essentials 
for purposes of semantic composition, is this: 
(26)  [one [apple [in [every [basket]]]]] 
Obviously, (25) in the salient reading of  (24a), where it is subject, cannot be of type e, 
which  leaves  the  generalized  quantifier  denotation  <<e,t>,t>  for  it.  For  the 
quantificational  determiner one we need  that one of its alternative types  which  yields 
<<e,t>,t>  when  combined, i.e. <<e,t>,<<e,t>,t>> (cf. Heim & Kratzer  1998: 207, n. 
26)."  Consequently, the NP [apple [in [every [basket]]]] is of type <e,t>, that is, of the 
common noun type, just  like apple. The PP in every basket, then, has to be combined 
with <e,t>-type apple so as to result in <e,t>-type apple in every basket. This means that 
the PP in every basket has to be of type <<e,t>,<e,t>>. Every basket being either of type 
<<e,t>,t>  or  of  type  <<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>>,  it  follows  that  the  t  e  of  in  is  either 
<<<e,t>,t>,<<e,t>,<e,t>>  or <<<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>>,<<e,t>,<e,t>>>. 
3rp 
(27)  one apple in every basket I <<e,t>,t> 
one / <<e,t>,<<e,t>,t>>  apple in every basket / <e,t> 
apple 1  <e,u  in every basket / <<e,t>,<e,u> 
in 1  every basket 1 
a) <<<e,t>,t>,<<e,t>,<e,t>>>  a) <<e,t>,t> 
b) <<<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>>,<<e,t>,<e,t>>>  b) <<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>> 
In  sum, a QR-less analysis of  inverse linking sentences like (24a) does not pose  any 
type  semantic problems  if  we take  into  account  that  in here  is not  a  typical  lexical 
preposition and thus not of type <e,<e,t>>. This analysis undermines Heim & Kratzer's 
(1998) suggestion that one can hardly do without QR in view of sentences like (24a). 
32  According  to Heim & Kratzer (1998:  182) every determiner is either of type  <<e,t>,<<e,u,t>> or 
<<e,t>,<<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>>>.  The latter is needed for DPs in object position. 
33  The type for the PP in ever)' basketjust derived, <<e,t>,<e,t>>, is that of the PP in Texas, which Heim 
& Kratzer (1998: 66) assume in their discussion of a Functional Application (FA) alternative to their 
Predicate Modification (PM) analysis of this constituent. As they assume type e for Texas in this PP, it 
follows that they derive <e,<<e,u,<e,u>> as the type for in. Note the systematic relationship between 
this type and the two possibilities given in (27) for in, such that all three types can be expressed in the 
general form <o,<<e,t>,<e,t>>>,  where o is type e or <<e,t>,t> or <<e,<e,t>>,<e,t>> depending on 
which of these the DP complement of the preposition has. It seems appropriate to work with PM (and 
the  corresponding  types)  when  confronted  with  lexical  prepositions  and  with  FA  (and  the 
corresponding  types)  when  confronted  with  non-lexical  prepositions.  Operating  by  FA  in  the 
interpretation of  non-lexical  PPs may  be  an  alternative to considering them  as either  semantically 
vacuous or as denoting "the identity function of the appropriate type" such that a PP like of John is 
analyzed  as  [of  John]  =  [John]  (Heim  &  Kratzer  1998:  62).  Note  that  assuming  type 
<e,<<e,t>,<e,t>>> for of if combined with e-type John results in the PP of John of type <<e,u,<e,u>, 
which can be combined with any type <e,o  expression, such as  father  or proud, for example, so as to 
result in another constituent of type <e,t> (fatherbroud of John) -  a satisfactory result. References 
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